

REVIEWS

Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives by John M. Collins, Brassey's, Inc., Washington, D.C., 2002, 333 pp., \$32.95 (softcover).

This is not a book to curl up with by the fire-side for a relaxing evening read. But for anyone looking for an authoritative treatise on national military strategy and how it is developed, it is difficult to imagine a more informative text. With authority based on years of experience as a military planner and strategic specialist, Collins has produced a thoroughly researched and well-presented study.

With text fully supported by specific historical examples, Collins logically follows the step-by-step development of a national military strategy. In Part I, "The Framework of Military Strategy," he focuses on national security interests, threats, objectives, and policies. He explains how nations (and coalitions) are part of a complex hierarchy with national strategies at the pinnacle and military tactics at the base. Thus, the start of developing military strategies lies in the identification of national security interests, a broad expression of wants and needs. These may seek to expand a state's jurisdiction, maintain the status quo, or merely preserve independence and territorial integrity, and the nation's fundamental way of life. From these objectives, government officials develop, and chiefs of state approve, national strategies designed to achieve these national objectives.

After this first step, Collins posits that there are five following steps in the development of national military strategy. Step two is an appraisal of the opposition, an identification of the nature, imminence, and intensity of apparent perils. The intelligence community must first estimate the capabilities of the opposition and then try to divine the intent of those opponents. The result is at best an estimate based on facts available. Step three is to prioritize short-, mid-, and long-term objectives that last from a few weeks to a decade or more. These goals should be as specific as possible. Step four is to formulate strategies. Here options are examined within policy guidance, based on facts available and assumptions carefully scrutinized. Plans are tailored to meet specific needs. In step five, national security and military strategists, in collaboration with logisticians and budget specialists, compare resource requirements with present and projected capabilities. Thus, they determine the feasibility of strategic and tactical plans. As part of this step, trade-offs between ends and means are addressed. The final step is reconciliation of differences in ends and means, developing alternatives if the risks are seen as unacceptable.

In Part II, "Fundamentals of Military Strategy," the author discusses the employment of building blocks to achieve politico-military objectives. Strategists develop a range of innovative options designed to solve particular problems under given conditions, then selecting a course of action they believe most likely would elicit desired responses from friends, enemies, and fence-straddlers. In discussing these fundamentals, Collins breaks them out into sev-

eral categories, each addressed separately: deterrence, warfighting, military preparedness, and arms control.

Part III, "Specialized Military Strategies," is divided into 10 chapters that separately address the full range of strategies available to a country. These include, for example, counterproliferation strategies, biological and chemical warfare strategies, traditional forces and strategies, sociopolitical terrorism, and coalition warfare strategies. The factors associated with each and the impact of their implementation are presented in detail.

Next, in Part IV, "Strategic Trailblazers," Collins offers examples of innovative strategic thinkers, citing Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Herman Kahn as strategic theoreticians; Cyrus the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, and George C. Marshall as strategic practitioners; and André Beaufre, Sergei Gorshkov, Billy Mitchell, and Mao Zedong as creative practitioners. He notes that, while some were only theoreticians, some practitioners, and some both, all were problemsolvers. To be successful, a military strategist must have intelligence, intellectual activism, analytical acumen, a broad knowledge base, tenacity, and a degree of salesmanship. Bringing his discussion into modern focus, the author discusses important factors that must be included in a modern strategic education system: intellectual freedom, unregimented regimens, prolific contacts, and continuity. These he applies to a look at the National War College.

Collins' final section, Part V, "Applied Strategies" uses the modern case study of U.S., UN, and NATO involvement in the Balkans. He applies factors discussed in his previous chapters, methodically comparing competitive security interests, objectives, force postures, policy options, and interactions of the parties involved. He summarizes strategic successes and shortcomings, then offers a checklist that might help national security decisionmakers determine whether military intervention in future foreign disputes is appropriate.

There probably exists no better text presenting both the broad factors and the detailed development of a national military strategy. This book in itself is a minicourse. If one would delve into the reasons this, or any, country takes the military action it does, this study is an excellent place to start.

BG PHILIP L. BOLTÉ
USA, Retired

Alamein by Jon Latimer, Harvard University Press, 2002, 319 pp., \$27.95.

For World War II veterans or aficionados who are interested in the North Africa campaign between the Allies and Axis, this is the bible. The author begins with a regional political history starting in 1900, giving the reader knowledge of why North Africa was important to victory in the contest, and continuing through 20 chapters, ending with, "The End of the Beginning" — the Allies would never lose another battle after Alamein.

This is a complete blow-by-blow, detailed, scholarly manuscript of personalities of major players, detailed strategies and background information of the reasons for battle orders, detailed movements of Axis and Allied units involved in battles, and analysis of defeats and advances. There is so much information that the reader will become overwhelmed with facts — personal quotes on battles, armor facts, sortie information, materiel flow, logistics problems, and ship dispatch and sinkings; the book reads as a medical text would in directing a major operation. The index, appendix, notes, and bibliography were 80 additional pages. A difficult read, but once absorbed, the reader will know the subject matter.

I would recommend this book, not to the squeamish, but to those analytical minds wanting facts on this subject.

LOUIS GORENC
Westland, MI

War of Words, Abraham Lincoln & the Civil War Press by Harry J. Maihafer, Brassey's, Inc., Washington, D.C., 2001, 296 pp., with notes, bibliography, and index, \$18.95 (paper), or 320 pp., \$27.50 (cloth).

Abraham Lincoln was often viewed by many of his contemporaries as a crude, unsophisticated bumpkin. Even by the end of the American Civil War, with his great victory at hand, many still did not appreciate Lincoln's greatness until after his death and historians were able to piece together the story of his presidency.

Maihafer has contributed further to that appreciation in his work, *War of Words, Abraham Lincoln & the Civil War Press*. Maihafer, a retired U.S. Army colonel and author of several other volumes of military and political history, relates Lincoln's shrewd handling of the press during the war in this well-researched and written book. In an age where we are used to and perhaps jaded by political spin, readers may be surprised to learn that modern politicians had nothing on Lincoln when it came to manipulating the media to control or influence how he, his administration, and events were portrayed in the press.

Lincoln was an ambitious and astute politician, who understood the importance of "court-ing" reporters and editors to get his views reported as accurately and as favorably as possible to win election. After his election to the presidency, Lincoln continued this courtship to win and sustain the public support necessary to win the war. He did this, as Maihafer argues in his introduction, "in a way that would appeal to his friends and not overly antagonize his enemies." Lincoln's handling of powerful and temperamental editors, like the *New York Tribune's* Horace Greeley and the *New York Herald's* James Gordon Bennett, was masterful yet fair, despite their fickleness and sometimes outright hostility. He appealed to editors' and reporters' egos through flattery and employment as his personal confidants.

Lincoln used his office in ways that would certainly raise eyebrows today, but was normal business in the 19th century, offering Bennett the ministerial post to France at one point, to try and influence favorable press from that Democratic editor. To ensure accurate reporting of his words, Lincoln provided copies of his speeches to reporters and editors, and at times, actually edited the newspaper copy before it went to press. Yet, Maihafer argues that while Lincoln's efforts sometimes bordered on deviousness, they were undertaken to promote the Union war effort and never undercut the basic integrity of "Honest Abe."

Readers who are looking for more insight into the military history of the Civil War may be disappointed. While Maihafer relates some of the battle history and offers insight into the personalities of the leaders on both sides, this is primarily a political history about how Lincoln used the power of the press to influence public opinion here and abroad in support of the Union war effort. In that respect, Maihafer has been highly successful in telling an interesting story that adds to our understanding of Lincoln's greatness as a wartime commander in chief.

STEVEN C. GRAVLIN
LTC, Armor, Retired

Nerve Center: Inside the White House Situation Room by Michael K. Bohn, Brassey's, Inc., Washington, D.C., 2003, 239 pp., \$24.95 (hardcover).

It is 0100 hours. A message is handed to you, which reads, "Explosions reported in the vicinity of regional government offices." Communications systems begin blaring, people demand answers, deadlines begin piling up, and to top it off, you are only in the middle of a 12-hour shift. Karbala, Kosovo, Kabul, or Kuwait — you could be pulling your shift in any number of world locations. Those who have worked in a tactical operations center know of the challenges faced by White House Situation Room Duty Officers.

In *Nerve Center: Inside the White House Situation Room*, Bohn quickly establishes that the movie and television portrayals of the Situation Room are mythical. So much so, that administrations continually strive to downplay meetings conducted in their conference rooms. In fact, recent administrations, specifically that of George W. Bush, have put to use a video teleconferencing system to reduce the media exposure of meetings of the President's principal deputies.

Nerve Center is presented in the same manner as Tom Clancy's nonfiction works, such as *Armored CAV*, *Airborne*, and *Marine*. It begins with an anecdotal introduction followed by an evolution from origin to present day operations. Continuing, Bohn details the capabilities and limitations of the Situation Room. He concludes with a fictional account of the Situation Room embroiled in a future crisis.

At its basic level, the Situation Room is the President's alert center. Born out of the 1961

Bay of Pigs failure, the Situation Room was created out of a determined need for the President's staff to have a communications facility within the White House to receive, sort, and distribute intelligence reports from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA. Moreover, President Kennedy wanted his national security advisor to be a personal presidential advisor, unlike previous administrations. Therefore, the national security advisor required access to the same information in near instantaneous fashion as the President's cabinet secretaries. What has evolved is an all-in-one alert center, communications hub, and meeting place that culminates intelligence for the President and his national security staff.

Bohn undoubtedly presents an insider's perspective of the Situation Room. As a former director of the Situation Room under President Reagan, he was intricately involved in its day-to-day operations. Although a retired naval intelligence officer, he does not limit his perspective to a military view. Bohn readily includes the perceptions of White House civilians (both permanent and presidential staff) and State Department, CIA, DIA, and NSA duty officers.

Nerve Center joins the growing ranks of recent current events literature. A strong delineation, however, is its historical, rather than journalistic, focus. It achieves professional value from its primary source documentation. Gathering sources from interviews, public documents, presidential papers, press releases, speeches, journal, newspaper, and internet articles, *Nerve Center* is very well documented for a relatively short book. Impressively, Bohn conducted over 60 personal interviews, to include two former Presidents, six national security advisors, and six situation room directors. Bohn went to all extents to complete this book.

Although not in the normal genre of interest in the armor community, it is an interesting book nonetheless. *Nerve Center's* appeal comes from its Tom Clancy-like approach. It chronicles a 'behind-the-scene' actor of U.S. security policy that has taken on a mystique all its own. While Hollywood created the myth, Bohn clarifies the legend.

1LT JOHN P.J. DEROSA
1-77 AR BN
Schweinfurt, Germany

Afghan Wars, Battles in a Hostile Land, 1939 to Present, Edgar O'Ballance, Brassey's, 1993 and 2002, 277 pp., \$18.95 (paperback).

Initially published in 1993, then updated and republished in 2002, the book minimally accomplishes its limited intent to provide a historical outline of military conflict in Afghanistan. Progressing chronologically, the author concentrates on the political origins and ramifications of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842), the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881), the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), the 10-year Soviet military involvement (1979-1989), and the resulting civil war and rise of the Taliban which followed the Soviet military withdrawal. Principally oriented toward politi-

cal cause and effects relative to Afghanistan's history of armed conflict, there is only superficial information regarding military doctrine and tactics employed during the conflicts.

Although the author has extensive military and journalistic credentials, and he cites personal visits to Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to further bolster his bona fides, the results of his visits were otherwise not footnoted in the text. Within the book's bibliography there are only two references dated 1990 or later. A reference to Czar Nicholas II on page 31 cites his visit to Afghanistan at a date well before that of his birth. It may be assumed that the author meant to cite Czar Nicholas, Nicholas II's grandfather, but the mistake left doubts as to the overall journalistic and editorial accuracy. The book contains no photographs and the 12 barebones maps are of negligible value, since they show limited political features and no geographic features or military symbols, and do very little to support or enhance the text.

The book's recurring theme does establish the political caution that Afghan political and military factions are inherently ideologically diverse, and tend toward instability. Alliances among the many political and tribal factions are more often opportunity based than not, and tend to be very temporary. The book's summarized conclusion is that Afghanistan cannot yet be regarded as a modern nation state. If political objectives are to be achieved through military means, then those objectives had best be both very specific and very limited.

Although the book satisfied its stated goal to provide a historical outline of Afghanistan's modern military history, there is very little of value for the student of military history, or for those who may be trying to gain insight of successful military doctrine and tactics as may apply to current military operations in Afghanistan.

RICHARD A. LAWSON
COL, Armor, USAR

Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power by Roger W. Barnett, Brassey's, Inc., Washington, D.C., 2003, 176 pp., notes, bibliography, index, \$39.95 (cloth), \$24.95 (paperback).

The author, a professor emeritus at the U.S. Naval War College, presents an illuminating argument that in light of the terrorist attacks against the United States, it needs to create a system of purging the constraints that dictate traditional military responses. The challenge, the author maintains, is that United States policymakers and the military take the initiative and prevent or defend against an enemy's ability to engage in asymmetrical warfare. He defines this nature of warfare as "taking the calculated risk to exploit an adversary's inability or unwillingness to prevent, or defend against certain actions." Conversely, a military situation where the weak using unconventional warfare is capable of defeating the strong.

The author analyzes a number of current asymmetrical scenarios, such as an adversary's use

of weapons of mass destruction. The argument presented is that the United States is deterred in dealing with asymmetrical warfare by a number of traditional constraints, such as operational, meaning reservations regarding the effect on the use of force and the relationship between ways, means, and risks. On organizational constraints, the problems a democracy has and its ideological relationship with international organizations are discussed. Regarding legal constraints, the book deals with the complexity of arms control, balance of power, and international law.

Finally contested is the moral aspect, such as the traditional American way against the use of force to resolve disagreements. These constraints, he maintains, need to be selectively disposed. The problem today, Barnett argues, is that U.S. national policymakers are in a dilemma because they struggle between conventional power projection that relies on massive firepower and maneuver warfare — an operational principle of the U.S. military during the 20th century — and at the same time, the military is tasked to act as peacekeepers, operating under the constraint of pacifism. He predicts that without changes in the rules of 20th-century symmetrical warfare and adjustments to the challenges of the 21st century, the country may face what he calls a “paralysis” that would increase risks and lead to the application of additional military power.

The author chastises U.S. policymakers for deliberate actions that allowed constraints to handicap the terms of military engagement, concluding by suggesting, “Constraints on the use of force should be reviewed in a holistic way.” Barnett advocates the military be given an opportunity to determine unnecessary constraints and be provided with the opportunity to deal with asymmetrical initiatives.

The concept of asymmetric warfare is not new. Consider the military philosophy of the ancient Chinese, Sun Tzu and his “art of war,” and Sir B.H. Liddell Hart’s “indirect approach” of the 20th century. Though much has been written on the subject, the most interesting portion of the book is how the author emphasizes the constraints that affect the necessary responses to deal effectively with asymmetrical vulnerability. At times the book lacks clarity, however, it is worth considering, especially for advanced military studies.

GEORGE F. HOFMANN, PH.D.
Department of History
University of Cincinnati

Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage by Noah Andre Trudeau, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 2002, 720 pp., \$34.95 (hardcover), \$18.95 (paperback).

Noah Andre Trudeau’s *Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage* should remain the standard single-volume work on this most decisive and heavily researched of Civil War battles for the foreseeable future. Trudeau’s eloquent narrative effectively covers the campaign from its inception, and successfully integrates the strategic,

tactic, tactical, and individual perspectives by synthesizing the vast amount of literature produced on the battle over the past 30 years.

Two particular aspects of this work make it particularly valuable. The first is the integration of the massive amount of literature produced on the battle over the previous three decades. Such literature has, as Trudeau notes, resulted in many revisions to the Gettysburg story as “[m]any cherished tales were found to fables, while other, long-overlooked acts of heroism and courage were revealed.” As an example, those readers expecting another glorification of Colonel Joshua Chamberlain at Little Round Top will find his ‘pivotal’ role reassessed. The second is Trudeau’s battlefield descriptions; the writing in *Gettysburg* captures the sights, sounds, and emotions of commanders, soldiers, and civilians as this bloody battle ebbed and flowed over the 3 days in June 1863. The fear felt by the participants is palpable, but so too is the bravery and determination. Trudeau’s stated goal was to produce a work that provides “a comprehensive narrative of one of the most unforgettable sagas in United States history.” To his credit, Trudeau has succeeded brilliantly, and future single-volume works on this battle should be judged by the quality of this work.

MAJ BENJAMIN TUCK
Fairfax, VA

Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force by Dr. Robert Worley, U.S. Army War College Special Report, published by the Strategic Studies Institute, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA, February 2003, 48 pp.

Dr. Worley’s national security career has included positions at RAND and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. This small pamphlet helps readers shape their ideas on strategy in the post-September 11th world. He reaches into Roman military history to articulate two types of warfare the legions encountered. Bellum is a strategy designed to defeat a standing army, and Guerra dealt with specialized tactics of marauding tribesmen. Worley’s pamphlet attempts to find a U.S. role in the realm of the Guerra strategy, and he argues that this type of fluid war requires the mobilization of all aspects of American national power (military, economic, and diplomatic).

The pamphlet analyzes three aspects of the global war on terror. The first is waging war against those organizations that employ terror to advance their agenda. The second is to wage war against states that enable terror groups to operate. Third, is to wage direct war against terror groups that pose a direct threat to the United States. The author argues that a narrower definition of our adversary is required and that declaring war on terrorism is too disorienting. He argues that we should declare war on specific aggressors in precise and specific language. Al Qaeda always operates in an environment of chaos and that its mission is the restoration of a lost Caliphate created in

their image. Worley identifies the threat using al Qaeda as an example and proceeds to discuss the application of deterrence, compellence, coercion, and preemption on transnational terrorism.

Worley identifies four attainable objectives derived from the Roman Guerra strategy: reducing the probability of destructive attacks; reducing the severity of attacks; preventing the conflict from becoming a wider war on Islam; and mitigating the effects of successful attacks through crisis management. Worley’s pamphlet helps align current strategic thinking and how to best protect America from transnational and state-sponsored terrorism.

LCDR YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN
MSC, USN

Editor’s Note: LCDR Aboul-Enein is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer serving in the Pentagon.

Chariots of the Desert: The Story of the Israeli Armoured Corps by David Eshel, Brassey’s Defence Publishers Ltd., London, 1989, 202 pp., \$24.95 (hardback).

In *Chariots of the Desert: The Story of the Israeli Armoured Corps*, veteran Israeli Defense Force (IDF) officer David Eshel provides the reader with an understanding of the transformation of the IDF’s armored forces in both equipment and tactics from infant nation to regional power. Using supporting maps and photos, he guides the reader through over 30 years of Israeli mobile warfare beginning with the 1948 War of Independence and ending with the 1982 Invasion of Southern Lebanon. He piques the readers interests by initially providing a general understanding of the early beginnings of the IDF, which started as irregular Jewish forces whose tactics in British Palestine prior to the 1930s focused primarily on the defense of Jewish settlements and supply convoy escort. In the mid-1930s, these forces moved beyond a primarily defensive role and transitioned to the offense in the form of special night squads (SNS) that seized the initiative by executing raids on Arab positions at night. Additionally, the Israelis were modifying and arming available vehicles to provide some measure of protection for their settlement resupply convoys. The employment of the SNS was the springboard for Israeli military doctrine that focused on maintaining initiative in the offense. The early vehicle developments and challenges contributed significantly to promoting unconventional military thought both in the IDF’s armored tactics and equipment developments.

As the British began to withdraw in the late 1940s, the Israelis found themselves with their backs against the Mediterranean, with better equipped Arab forces closing in on the other three sides. Facing a British enforced arms embargo, Eshel describes the innovative techniques that the Israelis employed to obtain tanks from outside sources, as well as developing a makeshift capability from the vast stocks of British equipment that was being destroyed as they withdrew. Given the success

of their makeshift mobile forces against better-equipped Arab armies during the 1948-1949 War of Independence, the Israelis worked to train and equip a flexible mobile armored force that could use firepower and maneuver to defeat the threats that surrounded the infant state.

Using maps and pictures throughout the book, Eshel demonstrates how that firepower, maneuver, and flexibility during The Sinai Campaign of 1956 could once again defeat better-equipped Arab forces. The Egyptians defended well forward in the Sinai, against the advice of their German advisory team, led by General Farmbacher who had served with Rommel's Afrika Corps. Farmbacher recommended a mobile defense that would allow Israeli forces to expand into the Sinai, extend their supply lines, and then finish the Egyptians off at natural engagement areas into which they would be canalized and destroyed by massed armored counterattacks. Instead, the Egyptians fought the plan and not the enemy. A constant theme that Eshel demonstrates is that during more than 30 years of mobile armored conflict, the Israelis were able to rout better-equipped Arab forces that lacked flexible leadership.

The successes of the Israeli armored forces in the Sinai solidified an armor-based doctrine that was built primarily on the proficiency of their crews in destroying enemy forces at range and then quickly maneuvering against the remaining forces once superiority was attained. The successes afforded the leadership of the Israeli armored forces greater prestige on the General Staff. This elevated status significantly benefited the development of armored doctrine and equipment upgrades, and developments that Eshel vividly describes with maps and pictures that cover operations up through Operation 'Peace for Galilee' where the Merkava earned its spurs during its foray into Lebanon during the early 1980s.

I highly recommend this book to any *ARMOR* reader interested in mobile warfare history, but especially for combat arms officers at the field grade and general officer level involved in transformation developments. While the challenges facing the Israelis have generally been of a regional nature, the lessons brought out by Eshel on the transformation of the IDF to meet developing threats are relevant to the transformation that we are now undertaking. The Israelis are a regional land power, they have an army that depends on a small core of professional soldiers, and they rely heavily on reservists who can be mobilized at a moment's notice in the event of crisis. Additionally, over the years, they have rapidly modified existing technologies and tactics to counter and defeat the evolving threats that their enemies present.

CPT DONNIE R. YATES
3d Bn, 307th Regiment
Mount Pleasant, SC

An American Soldier: The Wars of General Maxwell Taylor by John M. Taylor, Presidio Press, 2001, 496 pp., \$22.95, paperback.

On 20 April 1987, the information circulated among the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division

(Air Assault) that General Maxwell Taylor was dead. The division went into mourning, holding ceremonies of remembrance, and dispatching an honor guard to the funeral at Arlington National Cemetery. GEN Taylor had been the Screaming Eagles' first battlefield commander, and over 40 years later, his influence on the division would not be forgotten in the time of his final rest.

Two years after GEN Taylor's death, a well-received biography appeared, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen*, written by one of his sons, the noted, award-winning historian John M. Taylor. This time it is in paperback with a new title. It is presented in a logical, straightforward chronological manner.

While GEN Taylor may best be remembered now by viewers of *Band of Brothers* as the division commander of the 101st in World War II, his career encompassed many more challenges and facets. Commissioned in the Field Artillery from West Point in 1922, Taylor was a masterful linguist, learning Spanish, French, and Japanese, among others. Possessing a cool, detached personality and a keen intellect, Taylor graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1935. Of his class of 119, 62 eventually became general officers. He befriended COL "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell during a late 1930s tour as assistant military attaché to Japan. While there, he prepared an influential report on Japanese tactical doctrine that was used well into the coming war. Stillwell attempted to bring Taylor to China-Burma-India in the early part of World War II, but was prevented from doing so by GEN Marshall. In 1939, still only a captain at age 38, his career prospects seemed bleak. But, in 1940 he was selected to attend the Army War College.

The book ably and excitingly documents Taylor's exploits during World War II, first with the 82d Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy. On 14 March 1944, due to MG William C. Lee's heart attack, Taylor took command of the 101st Airborne Division in England, after being selected for the post by Eisenhower. Taylor would go on to lead the 101st through some of the U.S. Army's most famous campaigns of the war in Normandy and Operation Market Garden. He missed much of the division's fighting in encircled Bastogne, as he has been sent on temporary duty to the United States. He returned in time for the latter stages of the Ardennes campaign and subsequently led the division through the remainder of the European campaign, culminating in the seizure of Berchtesgaden.

The biography goes on to document Taylor's years as Superintendent of Cadets at West Point, Chief of Staff of the U.S. European Command, and then a return to the Far East as commander of the U.S. 8th Army during the closing stages of the Korean War. One of his quotes, derived from this experience, deserves to be repeated, "Expensive and complicated gadgets of infrequent use should not be allowed to absorb resources needed to support the most flexible weapon in our arsenal, the infantry soldier."

The last half of the book concerns Taylor's tour as Army chief of staff, his clash with the

Eisenhower Administration over defense policy, reemergence as a military advisor to President Kennedy, and subsequent tour as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1960s. It continues with Taylor's controversial service to the Johnson Administration as the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and subsequently as a military advisor. The biography concludes with a chapter on Taylor's retirement activities, death, and a brief summation of the general's life.

The book contains chapter notes, an index, three appendices consisting of addresses delivered by GEN Taylor, and two sections of well-chosen photographs. It contains one notable weakness; there are no maps to assist the reader as he follows Taylor's adventures and travels throughout the world. This does not take away from the overall value of the book. It is a labor of love, a sympathetic and engaging biography of an Army leader involved in the thick of the crucible of the nation's conflicts in the middle of the 20th century. It does not duck the turbulent issues surrounding Taylor's involvement in the Vietnam War and is fair-handed, but one should not look for an unbiased opinion from the author. I recommend this book to Army leaders. This is an important biography of one of the most influential and controversial American soldiers of the 20th century.

JIM DI CROCCO III
MAJ, IN, USAR
Grafenwoehr, Germany

* * *

LETTERS from Page 3

FM 23-10 clearly states that in a mechanized infantry battalion, each 2-man sniper team is assigned directly to an infantry squad of a company. This makes perfect sense given the range, speed, and weaponry of mechanized forces. Snipers are more than just good shots. They are an intelligence asset and are experts at stealthy movement and field craft. They can most effectively contribute within their effective range at the company level, especially in support of dismounted operations.

Mechanized battalion scouts operate at much greater ranges and are much more mobile. If battalion scouts are specifically establishing dismounted listening and observation posts, task organizing the company snipers is an option. However, I suggest that leaving the snipers to support the company outposts is a more likely and effective alternative.

Again, CPT Morrow is totally correct that snipers are underused and often forgotten. My concern is mainly with the appropriate echelon and I suggest that the doctrinal employment at company level will be more effective. At least give it a try and report back if it does not work.

The utility of the .50-cal rifle for use by battalion scouts should be explored and assessed as a separate and distinct issue.

CHESTER A. KOJRO
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired